METHODS
Our methodological approach follows closely the one pioneered by Erev and Roth 1 . For each one of the experimental conditions, the remaining 20 conditions have been used to estimate the free parameters values that minimize a Mean Square Deviation measure over such 20 conditions. The ensuing parameter estimates have subsequently been used to generate predictions over the left-out condition 2 . MSD is a suitable way to measure the distance between the estimated and the observed vectors of subjects' choice frequencies. Labeling with y the vector of the observed choice frequencies (of length ! N ) and with y' the vector of the estimated ones, MSD is defined as follows:
It is a broadly accepted metric to measure data fitting 1, 3, 4 . The 21 experimental datasets we could gather are mostly in the form of sequences of aggregate average players' relative choice frequencies, computed over blocks of a given number of repetitions of the stage game. Those relative frequencies were calculated for the two different typologies of players (row and column). In order to better compare the performances of different models with different degrees of complexity we further considered two, widely accepted, measures that take into account the number of free parameters: the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 6 . According to these two criteria, a measure of model error is penalized proportionally to the number of free parameters in the model. The model to which corresponds the lowest value of AICc (BIC) is to be preferred. If we consider a series of empirically observed average frequencies of play (say In the case in which the residuals can be assumed normally distributed with a constant variance, then AIC and BIC can be computed as:
and
where k is the number of free parameters in the model. A variant of AIC is the so called corrected AIC, computed as: For our analysis we used AICc and BIC as defined in (1), (2) and (3), since it is reasonable to assume that residuals are normally distributed. Indeed, residuals are defined as the differences between observed and estimated average frequencies of play, which are asymptotically normally distributed (Central Limit Theorem). Tables S6 and S7 collect our results.
Since the models that we compared are all stochastic, we computed -for each experiment and for each parameters configuration as well -the average MSD values over 200 simulations, both in the calibration and in the prediction stage. Simulations reproduced exactly the structure of the laboratory conditions, including subject pairing, information feedback available to agents, agents number and payoffs. To make simulations results comparable, all models initialization was set to assure equal probabilities to choose each action at the first round of the simulation. The grid search for optimal parameters value was conduced on a broad parameter space. For Self-tuning EWA model (stEWA) we considered the values of its unique free parameter in the interval from 0.1 to 10.0, by steps of 0.1. For Basic Reinforcement model (BR) we considered the values of its parameter in the interval from 15 to 80, by steps of 1. For our RB1 we considered values of ! " in the interval from 0.05 to 1.00, by steps of 0.05. For REL model we considered all the possible combinations of values of its two free parameters varying, the first, in the interval from 26 to 34 by steps of 1 and, the second, in the interval from 2.3 to 3.3 by steps of 0.1. Finally, for Normalized Fictitious Play (NFP) model we considered all the possible combinations of values of its two free parameters varying, the first, in the interval from 1.5 to 3.5 by steps of 0.25 and, the second, in the interval from 0.1 to 0.9 by steps of 0.1
The model NNET2 consists in a traditional one-layer analog Perceptron, where output units are fed back as usually by an error (target-output) measure: thus, the regret factor is dropped from the equation defining weights updating:
MATERIALS
The learning model
Our Perceptron-based model presents some architectural analogies with established models of learning in games; however, it also has some peculiar features that differentiate it from its competitors. At the end of this section we present a concise formal presentation of the different models competing with each other in our prediction task. Established learning models in economics have two main, cyclically intertwined, component processes: 1. Behavior is generated by some stochastic choice rule that takes as input raw "propensities" to play actions, and transforms them in probabilities to play the action. 2. Learning employs feedback from the outcomes of experience to modify propensities, which in turn affect subsequent choice. Our model resembles other learning models in economics only in part of its architecture: one can easily map the network outputs into "propensities", and normalization of choice probabilities plays the role of the "choice function". What makes our model different is that choice also depends directly from the payoff structure of the game (represented in the "input layer"). In other words, while in a typical economic learning model choice is a function of propensities only, here it is a function of propensities and the payoffs of the game. Furthermore, the learning rule itself depends upon the input payoffs. This architecture provides the Perceptron model with a peculiar capability to discriminate among different games. Conventional learning models in economics are designed for repeated games. There is learning, but no perception or discrimination: the learning agent is unable to discriminate between different games at a given moment. If given abruptly two different games, it would do the same (or just throw away what has been learned). On the other hand, discrimination is something Perceptrons do pretty well: since output is affected by perceived inputs (the "input layer"), a same network, after learning, will react differently to different games. However, does this architectural difference matter also in the case considered in this paper -even when players face always the same game? The answer is yes. A highly simplified example will clarify the mechanics of the model. To make things simpler, we will consider a network with only two inputs and two action nodes. For simplicity, let's start from an initial state in which all connection weights are equal to 0.3 (usually they are instead randomly initialized). In the first run, output units are activated, assuming values that are the sum of the inputs, weighted by connection weights, and transformed by the hyperbolic tangent function (her we assume beta=1). On both units the output will be Tanh(0.24+0.06), i.e. 0.291. In practice, this implies that both actions will be played with equal probability after normalization. Imagine that after tossing the coin the network plays the "low node" action. It turns out to be the wrong move, and a regret of 0.6 is experienced. After revision, the weights will be: and the output vector (0.529, -0.223), that after normalization, will imply a 0.667 probability to play the "high node" action. Notice that changing the input weights will change the learning trajectory even if the inputs always repeat themselves. Once more, a simple numeric example will clarify the point. Consider the following network, which is identical to the one in Fig. S1 .3 and against the same environment, except for the input vector, which has now been modified to (0.5,0.5). The initial output will be exactly the same: If the network plays also in this case the "low node" action and receives a same amount of regret .6, the network will change as follows: which, after normalization, will imply a 0.617 probability to play the "high node" action. Will differences in learning paths persist in the long run, and with full-fledged networks? We conduced a further analysis over the 10 Erev et al. games 7 , comparing the learning trajectories of pairs of networks with complete and correct payoff inputs with those of pairs of networks with "flat" inputs (e.g. representing all inputs as 0.5), which is equivalent to a simpler "attraction and choice rule" architecture. All the rest was kept the same. We observed that in general the two versions produce average behaviors which are statistically significantly different (test of the difference of two means). Moreover, the more diverse the payoffs, the more the trajectories tend to differ (up to a 4% difference in the predicted frequencies of play). Thus, the Perceptron could be well approximated by a more conventional learning architecture only in the cases in which all payoffs are similar enough. A short analysis of a few sample games (see Figs. S1.8, S1.9 and S1.10) may help to understand why the Perceptron model succeeds. In general, the Perceptron has very fast convergence to rather stable frequencies of choice (similarly to stEWA and NFP, differently from the reinforcement learning models, which are slower to adapt). Its advantage thus is not in mimicking well the experimental speed of learning (which is lower). Instead, its success is due to a large extent to its ability to fit the experimental average behavior in the long run. It is well known from the literature on the "learning direction" 13 that subjects tend to adjust in the direction of the ex-post best response in a large variety of experimental games. Our model seems to capture an empirically valid quantification of this qualitative tendency by tuning the intensity of the adjustment proportionally to the regret (and conditionally to the salience of the payoffs). The NFP model follows similar learning principles and performs in very similar ways. Why do other models do worse? As well known, reinforcement learning models respond mainly to experienced payoffs, and thus adapt slowly and fail to capture all the relevance of foregone payoffs even in the long run. This seems to be a source of empirical relative weakness in the experiments considered here. It is less clear what may be the source of relative weakness of stEWA (which by the way has a very good performance). On the one hand, stEWA tends to preserves a weight for reinforcement learning, that may keep it away form the long run average behavior of experimental subjects. The model has one free parameter and adjusts via its self-tuning mechanism two additional parameters. We conjecture (quite wildly) that this may lead to some form of over-fitting that makes it comparatively less robust (this is consistent with the fact that the model is much stronger in fitting single games in insulation, while its performance deteriorates in the cross-prediction task).
Competing Models
Basic Reinforcement Learning (BR) Model (Erev et al. 1998) 1 Attractions updating. The reinforcement deriving from receiving payoff x is given by :
where ! x min is the minimum payoff. Given that in period t the i-th agent has played her k-th pure strategy receiving a payoff x:
Stochastic choice rule. The probability ! p ik t ( ) for player i to play her k-th pure strategy at time t, is defined as:
Initial attractions. In the first period, agent i's initial attractions for her j-th and k-th pure strategies satisfy the condition:
for all the possible combinations of k-th and j-th pure strategies.
Denoted with ! X i the average absolute payoff for player i, the initial strength parameter is defined as follows:
This parameter is assumed to be equal for all players. Hence, player i's initial propensities (attractions) are defined as:
where
( ), the initial probability of choice, is given by
the number of all pure strategies of player i.
Erev and Roth's Reinforcement Learning (REL) Model (Erev et al. 2002) 8
Attractions updating. The propensity of player i to play her k-th pure strategy at period t+1 is given by: ( ) is defined as the expected absolute distance between the payoff from random choices and the expected payoff given random choices, denoted as
For periods ! t > 1, authors define:
, where x is the received payoff, m the number of player i's pure strategies, and
as:
Authors fix initial attractions as follows: Attractions updating. At time t, player i associates to her j-th pure strategy the attraction
given by:
where are parameters, 
Stochastic choice rule. Attractions are mapped into choice probabilities by the following: ( ) and suggest at least four ways to do that. In our specific case, we defined initial attractions according to the method used adopted in REL -leading to first-period uniformly distributed choices.
Normalized Fictitious Play (NFP) Model (Ert and Erev 2007, Erev et al. 2007) 7,10
Initial propensities. At time period ! t = 1, player i-th associates to the propensity of playing her pure strategy j the value corresponding to the expected payoff from random choice (denoted by
Thus:
Attractions updating. Each time step, propensities are updated according to the following: 
( ) gives a measure of payoff variability and ! " is a free parameter tuning sensitivity to payoffs.
where recent i is the most recent experienced payoff from action i. In the first period, authors suggest to set
Datasets Considered
Suppes and Atkinson (1960) 11 Experimental settings and data: This game was played by 20 pairs of subjects for 210 times. The payoff matrix was known to the subjects. The authors presented the data they gathered in 7 blocks of 30 repetitions of the stage game. Equilibrium prediction: According to the unique mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, both players are expected to choose A with probability 0.4 and each of the other strategies with probability 0.2.
Rapoport and Boebel (1992) 13
Experimental settings and data: Both those constant-sum games were played in two sessions. In the first session, 10 pairs of subjects played the game for 120 rounds, while in the second session subjects exchanged roles and played another 120 rounds of the game. Here are presented only data gathered in the first sessions. The authors presented the proportions of A and B choices in 4 blocks of 30 trials. Fig. S2 .7 shows the matrix of payoffs and Figs. S2.8-9 report experimentally observed frequencies of choice. Equilibrium prediction: According to the unique mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, both players are expected to choose A with probability 
Equilibrium prediction:
In the unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, player 1 chooses A1 with probability ! p = 1 2 and player 2 chooses A2 with probability
Erev, Roth, Slonim and Barron (2007) 7
Experimental settings: Those ten randomly selected games were played by 9 pairs of subjects for 500 rounds. The numbers in each matrix represents probabilities that the players will win a fixed amount ! w on each trial. For example, if on a given trial both players choose A, then player 1 will win ! w with the specified probability ! p 1 and player 2 will win ! w with probability ! 1" p 1 . A player who does not win ! w earns zero for that period. Subjects knew the probabilities that define the game. The authors presented the average frequencies of choice A in 5 blocks of 100 trials. ERSB G1 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 20 41 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 13 82 . Fig. S2 .14 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .15 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G2 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 67 68 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 27 34 . Fig. S2 .16 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .17 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G3 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 16 71 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 9 71. Fig. S2 .18 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .19 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G4 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 13 33 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 5 11. Fig. S2 .20 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .21 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G5 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 53 112 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 3 14 . Fig. S2 .22 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .23 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G6 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 19 23 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 31 46. Fig. S2 .24 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .25 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G7 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 5 23 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 39 46. Fig. S2 .26 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .27 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G8 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 3 13 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 17 65. Fig. S2 .28 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .29 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G9 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability ! p = 17 26 and player 2 to choose strategy A2 with probability ! q = 53 104 . Fig. S2 .30 shows the matrix of payoffs and Fig. S2 .31 reports experimentally observed frequencies of choice. ERSB G10 -Equilibrium prediction and data: The game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, in which player 1 is expected to choose strategy A1 with probability 15 Experimental settings and data: In three different experimental sessions, three groups of subjects (for a total of 60 participants) played for 100 times a game that the authors named Parasite Game. This game involves two players and an indifferent nature. Nature moves first and decides where a resource for player 1 becomes available (H or T, which stands for two different locations). Then, T and H are also the locations where player 1 can search for the resource and where player 2 can steal it from player 1. So, success for player 1 means to guess nature's move but not to be outguessed by player 2; for player 2, instead, it means to outguess player 1 when player 1 has guessed nature. Two different protocols were considered: one in which ! w was initially declared to participants (labeled with KNOWL=1) and one in which ! w was unknown by participants (labeled with KNOWL=0). We used data gathered in the three session using protocol KNOWL=0. In the first session, 6 pairs of subjects played the Parasite Game with Player 2 Table S1 shows the accuracy of the predictions of the models; for parametric models, in each of the 21 different conditions (games), results correspond to those computed with the parameter configuration which best fits the other 20 games.
Avrahami, Güth and Kareev (2005)
For each parameter configuration, 200 runs of the models were made. Values shown in table S1 are then obtained as a mean over 200 independent observations. MSD-Scores are computed as ! 100 " MSD, and a smaller value corresponds to a more accurate prediction of the experimentally observed dataset. The row denoted with PB0 (*) reports the performance in terms of MSD scores of the model PB0 without the opponent's payoff as input. Table S2 shows the 95% confidence interval width for average MSD-Scores reported in Table S1 . The sample size is ! n = 200. Table S4 shows the standard deviation for average MSD-Scores reported in Table S1 . The sample size is ! n = 200. ! Y (if the p-value corresponds to the two digits number 0.00, then only the symbol "F" is reported). Letter "S" in the table means that ! Y is significantly larger than ! X (if the p-value corresponds to the two digits number 1.00, then only the symbol "S" is reported). Letter "T" corresponds to a tie (between parentheses the p-value are reported). Random vs Nas h 
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